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Abstract
The traditional measure of market power is the HHI, which gives implausible results given
the low elasticity of demand in electricity spot markets, unless it is adapted to take account
of contracting. In its place the Residual Supply Index has been proposed as a more suitable
index to measure potential market power in electricity markets, notably in California and
more recently in the EU Sector Inquiry. The paper investigates its value in identifying the
ability of rms to raise prices in an electricity market with contracts and capacity constraints
and nd that it is most useful for the case of a single dominant supplier, or with a natural
extension, for the case of a symmetric oligoply. Estimates from the Sector Inquiry seem to
t this case better than might be expected, but suggests an alternative dention of the RSI
dened over exible output that should give a more reliable relationship.
1 Introduction
Electricity wholesale markets in Europe are typically very concentrated, and in most Continental
countries the two largest generation companies provide more than 50% of domestic supply. Where
internal transmission constraints restrict the number of generators that can compete to supply
consumers in a particular area, levels of concentration can be even higher. Thus in each of
the two separated parts of Denmark the Herndahl Hirshman Index (HHI) exceeded 5,000 in
2004 (EC, 2006).1 In Italy, which fragments into separate price zones if interzonal transmission
links bind, Calabria had an HHI averaging just below 5,000 in the rst two months of 2007,
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1The HHI is dened as the sum of the squared market shares measured in percentages, with 10,000 corresponding
to a monopoly, and 5,000 a symmetric duopoly.
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although other zones had lower values. The EU Sector Inquiry examined market power in the
electricity and gas markets, publishing its ndings in 2007. It found values for the HHI in
Germany ranging from 1,795 to 2,665 (based on total generation). The values are rather less for
in-merit generation capacity, but rather more allowing for exports over interconnectors (London
Economics, 2007, {6.2)). The values for HHI in The Netherlands ranged from 1,861 to 3,397
(based on total generation and ignoring interconnector capacity) or from 997 to 3,388, allowing
the largest generator to obtain the maximum allowed capacity of 400 MW on the interconnector
(London Economics, 2007, {8.2).
Electricity has a very low elasticity of demand, particularly in the short time periods over
which spot markets clear. The standard Cournot oligopoly model that might seem suitable for
describing electricity wholesale market equilibria when markets are tight has the well-known
property that the Lerner Index (the proportional price-cost margin for a rm) is directly propor-
tional to the market share of that rm and inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand.
High market shares and low elasticities should therefore lead to very high price-cost mark-ups
considerably higher than are observed. We therefore have an apparent inconsistency between
theory and evidence.
2 Modelling market power
In the simple Cournot oligopoly model, rm i maximizes prot i = pqi   Ci(qi); for which the
f.o.c. is
di
dqi
= 0 = p  C 0i   p

qi
Q

 Qdp
pdQ

; (1)
where demand, Q =
P
qj , is a function of the price, p, and C 0i(qi) is the marginal cost of rm i.
The Lerner Index, (LI) Li, for rm i (a standard measure of the ability to raise prices) is then
given by
Li  p  C
0
i
p
=
si
"
; (2)
where si is the market share of the rm qi=Q, and " is the elasticity of market demand, as a
positive number. Estimates for the value of the short-run demand elasticity for electricity are
quite low, and over periods of months possibly below 0:25 for the domestic and other industry
sector, judging by the response to extraordinarily sharp price increases in Norway over the period
November 2002 to May 2003 (von der Fehr, Amundsen and Bergman, 2005).
The attractiveness of the HHI as a suitable measure of market power follows from various
manipulations of the Cournot oligopoly solutions to (1) and (2). If there are constant returns to
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scale, C 0i = ci, then total industry prots  are given by
 =
X
(p  c)qi =
X
(pLi)(siQ)
=
pQ
"
(
X
s2i ); and so from (2)

pQ
=
H
"
=
X
siLi; (3)
so the ratio of industry prots to revenue is the HHI divided by the market demand elasticity,2
which is also equal to the weighted average LI,
P
siLi.
This immediately poses a puzzle for conventional Cournot oligopoly analysis, for the com-
bination of low demand elasticities with small numbers of competing rms (high HHI) would
normally suggest a very high Lerner Index, in the cases cited above perhaps as high as 150-200%,
and an improbably high ratio of prots to revenue - approaching 100%. Of course, elasticities in
the longer run are higher, and short-run prot maximization that induces excessive entry would
be imprudent, quite apart from attracting the attention of competition authorities.
Nevertheless, economists analyzing the electricity market, either in the course of market
surveillance or in a merger inquiry, need tractable analytical models of price setting if they are
to propose behavioural or structural remedies for the threat of market power. Although Supply
Function Equilibrium models (for example, as deployed by Green and Newbery, 1992 and more
recently by Hortacsu and Puller, 2006) are theoretically attractive, they pose formidable practical
and conceptual problems if they are to be used for market monitoring, and even more so in quasi-
judicial investigations of the kind conducted by competition authorities. Although it is possible
to test whether rm behaviour is prot maximizing, given the bids of other rms (Sweeting,
2007; Hortacsu and Puller, 2006), as there may be many such equilibria it is hard to make rm
predictions about price setting under a di¤erent industry structure (e.g. post-merger, or after
increasing transmission capacity into a constrained zone). More to the point, Newbery (2008)
shows that during any period in which the largest rm is pivotal (as described below), it will
behave as a Cournot oligopolist (and more generally, supply functions approach the Cournot
solution at peak demand), and so we are still left with the Lerner mark-up problem.
A part of the solution is to note that forward contracts greatly reduce the incentive to exercise
market power in the spot market, as Allaz and Vila (1993) noted for Cournot competition and
Newbery (1998) conrmed for Supply Function Equilibria.3 Forward contracts are extremely
2The HHI is conventionally computed by taking the shares as percentages rather than fractions, e.g. in a
symmetric 5-rm case with si = 20%, HHI = 5  202 = 2; 000. To interprete H=", H must be measured as a
fraction - in this case H = 0:2.
3But note that Murphy and Smeers (2005) show that if the choice of capacity is chosen knowing that in the
subsequent periods contracting will make competition more intense and prots lower, they will invest less in order
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important in liberalized electricity supply industries, given the considerable volatility of prices
over periods of hours, days, seasons, and, in the case of storage hydro systems like Norway, even
over years, combined with the need of retailers to secure their supplies ahead of time when the
spot market or power exchange is only a relatively thin residual market.
2.1 The Residual Supply Index
Given the apparent potential to raise prices above the competitive level, electricity wholesale
markets are typically subject to market surveillance, in many case by a Market Monitoring Unit.
Such units collect data to assess whether there are incentives to raise prices appreciably, and to
investigate cases in which prices appear to be unreasonably high. One of the more attractive
indices of market power is the Residual Supply Index, RSI, which was initially developed by
the California Independent System Operator.4 The RSI for company i measures the percent of
supply capacity remaining in the market after subtracting company is capacity to supply to the
prompt market (after allowing for contractual commitments to supply on terms unrelated to the
spot price). Smaller values of the RSI imply greater market power. The RSI measures the extent
to which a rm is pivotal, that is, its uncommitted capacity is essential if demand is to be met
(at an acceptable price).
RSIi = (Total Capacity less Company is Relevant Capacity)/Total Demand = (
X
j 6=i
kj + xi)=D
where:
Total Capacity is the total regional supply capacity plus total net imports,
Company is Relevant Capacity is companys is capacity, ki, less company is contract
obligations, taken as xi, and
Total Demand, D, is metered load plus purchased ancillary services.
When the RSI is greater than 100 percent, the suppliers other than company i have enough
capacity to meet the demand of the market, and company i might be expected to have less
inuence on the market clearing price.5 On the other hand if residual supply is less than 100
percent of demand, company is uncommitted capacity is needed to meet demand, and is, there-
fore a pivotal player in the market. In such periods Cournot behaviour is to be expected (at
to keep capacity tight and prices higher in compensation, just as Kreps and Wilson (1982) showed that intense
price (Bertrand) competition in the post investment period would lead to Counot choices of capacity that would
constrain output and support Cournot equilibria. In this paper we assume that capacity decisions have already
been made and do not respond to any changes in the market.
4See She¤rin (2001, 2002a,b) and She¤rin and Chen (2002).
5 In a supply function equilibrium the price-cost margin can remain high even when no rm is pivotal, and, of
course, collusion can also increase the price-cost margin.
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best, collusion might lead to even less competitive outcomes). Most Market Monitoring Units
take as a screen an RSI of less than 110%, as this provides for a minimal level of reserves, below
which the Loss of Load Probability rises sharply, and with it the scarcity value of power. Fig-
ure 1 provides evidence from the California market that the RSI might be a useful indicator of
market power and the ability to raise the price-cost margin. When used as a merger screen, the
RSI is sometimes qualied by dening capacity to be economic capacity, dened as the capacity
that would cover its costs at some price not greater than a predetermined mark-up (say 50%)
above the market clearing price. Brunekreeft (2008) has used the RSI in his innovative social
cost-benet analysis of unbundling vertically integrated German electricity companies.
Figure 1: Relationship between the price-cost mark-up and RSI for California (She¤rin, 2002)
3 Analysis
Consider an isolated region (or one in which net imports are constrained and have been subtracted
from domestic demand) in which all but one of the generators are non-pivotal in a given period
(e.g. one hour), and suppose that they produce at full capacity (which requires that their
marginal cost is su¢ ciently below the market price), so that the only generator i with market
power produces qi, sells xi forward contracts at price f , and thus has prots
i = p(qi   xi) + fxi   Ci(qi): (4)
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The f.o.c. for the choice of output and hence spot sales is
@i
@qi
= 0 = p  C 0i(qi) 
p
"

qi   xi
Q

:
where Q = D(p). The rms RSI is ri = (
P
j 6=i kj + xi)=D(p) (at the prevailing price, p) so
qi   xi = D(p)  (
P
j 6=i kj + xi) = Q(1  ri), from which we derive the Lerner condition:
Li  p  C
0
i
p
=
1  ri
"
: (5)
The f.o.c. give exactly the same expression for the Lerner Index as (2), although the e¤ect of
more contract cover is to increase the RSI for the rm, possibly very substantially. This simple
model suggests that the RSI is potentially useful as an index of market power.
The case for the HHI as an index of market power in the presence of contracts is less clear. If
sj  (qj  xj)=Q, the shares of uncommitted output (where
P
sj < 1 if there is any contracting)
then it is still the case that
H
"
=
X
siLi;
as in (3), although the si are typically unobservable. There is no longer any simple relationship
between industry prots and the HHI.
3.1 The Lerner Index and RSI in wholesale electricity markets
Many electricity wholesale markets operate either as pools or power exchanges, in which genera-
tors submit o¤ers to supply varying amounts at successively higher prices, and the demand side
species the level of demand it would take at successively lower prices.6 Such markets are best
described by the intersection of supply and demand functions, with generators submitting supply
functions, as in gure 2, which shows the Market Clearing Price (MCP) in the Amsterdam Power
Exchange.7
The two extremes considered here are the benchmark competitive case, in which the supply
function is the marginal cost schedule, and the Cournot equilibrium, in which the rm inelastically
6 In a pool, demand typically represents all uncontracted consumption demand, while in a power exchange some
of the demand bids come from suppliers, including generators, who have precommitted more sales than they have
contracted production, and wish to purchase the shortfall.
7European power exchanges and electricity pools typically operate under the ction that there are no transmis-
sion constraints, which are then handled by the System Operator calling for bids and o¤ers in a balancing market
or mechanism (see e.g. Newbery, 2005). In the US, nodal pricing or locational marginal prices are determined at
each node by supply and demand there, and these typically di¤er, possibly substantially, in the presence of trans-
mission constraints. Transmission constraints e¤ectively fragment the market into submarkets, and the anslysis of
this paper properly refers to those constrained sub-markets.
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Figure 2: Market clearing price detail from APX Hour 12, 26 June 2007
o¤ers a xed supply at whatever MCP is determined from the demand side. In an electricity
wholesale market, the market might be considered competitive if the MCP were set at the System
Marginal Cost, SMC, mS , which would be the marginal cost of the most expensive plant called
upon to operate. One would normally expect generating companies to have a variety of plant
with di¤ering variable costs, and that they would dispatch them in order of increasing variable
costs, lowest variable cost rst (the merit order). If the variable costs of each plant type is
constant, the cost function will now be Ci(qi) =
Pk 1
j gjibj +(qi 
Pk 1
j gji)mi, bj < bj+1 < mi;
where gji is the capacity of plant type j held by rm i, whose constant marginal cost is bj , and
mi is the marginal cost of the kth least expensive plant that rm i nds it protable to commit,
where k is dened by Argmax
k
Pk 1
j gji  qi: Apart from calculating actual prots, the only
interest of the cost function lies in its marginal cost, and the previous formulae will continue to
work with C 0i = mi.
London Economics, in its analysis of six European electricity markets, dened the Lerner
Index as (price-SMC)/price, which we can term LS
LS =
p mS
p
; (6)
Li = LS +
mS  mi
p
: (7)
The EU Sector Inquiry (London Economics 2007) has explored the extent to which various
electricity companies exercise market power, using a variety of indices, including this version of
the Lerner Index, LS , and the closely related Price-cost mark-up (PCMU) P = (p  mS)=mS ,
where P = LS=(1 LS). Of the various markets studied, the German market is one of the more
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interesting, and a statistically highly signicant relation is found between the RSI and both the
LI and PCMU.8 London Economics regressed LS for various companies i on its RSI for each
hour:
LS =   ri: (8)
If equation (5) holds then  =  if mi = mS and otherwise  <  (although
mS mi
p is likely
to be small if the dominant rm is su¢ ciently diversied and has marginal plant similar to
those of other generators). The (robust Huber-White) estimated values for company CO2 were
 = 3:560:26 and  = 3:130:24 (London Economics, 2007, p352), consistent with (5) although
correcting for auto-regression increased the values of  and  and slightly increased the value of
their di¤erence. The results for other companies were similar, e.g. for company CO10 the values
were  = 3:64 0:1 and  = 3:56 0:1 (not correcting for auto-regression, which for CO2 raised
the standard errors from 0:1 to 0:26). The other two companies (CO3 and CO17) had similar
values for  but rather lower values for .
The results of this empirical estimation seem surprisingly good, and are consistent with
a demand elasticity of " = 1= = 0:26, which might seem rather high but is consistent with
estimates derived from the impact of the large price rise in Scandinavia following the drought
of 2002, which for the domestic sector were about 0:23 (von der Fehr et al, 2005). Note that if
imports and other capacity-constrained production is subtracted from total demand to give the
residual demand facing the oligopolists, then the elasticity of residual demand will typically be
higher than for total demand.
London Economics also estimated this equation for other countries, usually nding very
signicant parameter values, although low values for R2. Thus for Spain  = 4:1  1:9 and
 = 3:51:7 (semi-robust estimates for CO1) and similar estimates for the other large company,
CO4. These two companies on average accounted for 70% of demand and had RSIs below 110%
for over 40% of the hours. Thus Spain has similar values to Germany, but for the largest company
in The Netherlands (with 27% of capacity),  = 45:2 7:5,  = 43:9 6:2 (correcting for serial
correlation), suggesting again that they are equal, but also suggesting remarkably small values
for the demand elasticity of 0.02. The largest company is the only one with an RSI below 110%
for any signicant fraction of the time (20% in its case). In contrast the two largest German
rms had an RSI less than 110% for over 55% of the time.
Curiously, the simple model seems to match the Dutch market with only one pivotal gen-
erator most of the time, better than the German market, which has several (up to four) pivotal
generators or Spain (almost a duopoly), but empirically the parameter estimates are rather good
for Germany and less good for The Netherlands and Spain (with large standard errors and a
8although the value for R2 was very low at 2%.
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very poor R2) .That suggests extending the model to several generators with market power as
more descriptive of Spain and Germany.
3.2 Symmetric oligopoly with contracting
Suppose next that there is a symmetric n-rm oligopoly, where each rm has capacity ki and
has identical cost function C(qi). Each rms prot is given by (4) and the f.o.c. again give the
Lerner index (2) with si = (qi   xi)=D is the share of uncommitted output available to the spot
market as a share of total demand, and Li = LS = si=": In the perfectly symmetric case where
xi = x, then qi = q = D=n. If the ratio of demand to capacity is q=k =  = (1 + ) 1 (the load
factor), then the RSI r is
r =
(n  1)k + x
D
= (
(n  1)
n
+
x
nq
): (9)
This gives a relation between x and r that combined with (2) gives
L =
s
"
=
1  x=q
n"
=
+n 1
n   r
"
 1 + (1 
1
n)  r
"
 1  r
"
; (10)
for small , i.e. when demand is tight, just as in (5). Note that in the estimated equation (8)
 = (1 + (1   1n))=" >  = 1=", consistent with the econometric estimates for German and
Spanish companies that suggest that  > .
This model might work for Spain provided the fringe companiesoutput (and imports) is
subtracted from total demand, in which case " is the elasticity of the residual demand, which
might still be 70-90% of total demand. The implied elasticity of total demand will be lower than
that estimated. Given that  = 3:5, the elasticity of the residual demand would be 0:29 and for
total demand might be 0:23.
One should be cautious about the linearity implied by the approximation (10) as " is not
constant for linear demand, and the approximation is only valid for q=k near 1. To make further
progress in relating the Lerner index to the RSI we need a theory of forward contracting to
determine the equilibrium x=q.
4 Determination of the equilibrium level of contracting
Proposition 1 For an oligopoly of n capacity-unconstrained rms with possibly varying marginal
costs and capacities, facing a capacity-constrained fringe of rms and a linear demand schedule,
the contract cover of each oligopolist will be the same fraction of output, 1  1n .
Proof. See Appendix.
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Contract coverage (measured by x=q) increases from 0 (under monopoly) to 50% (under a
duopoly) to 80% (if there are ve rms), and converges on full coverage if there are su¢ ciently
many rms.
In the special case of symmetric rms facing the linear demand schedule D(p) = a p; where
supply equals demand in equilibrium (i.e. no net imports) D(p) =
P
qi = Q,9 with the same
constant marginal costs, C 0i = m = mS , A  a m; the formulae in the appendix give
x =
(n  1)A
n2 + 1
, q =
nA
n2 + 1
;
x
q
= 1  1
n
; (11)
p = m+
A
(n2 + 1)
; Q =
n2A
n2 + 1
, (12)
The share of uncommitted output, 1 x=q = 1=n, so each rms ratio of uncommitted output
to market demand is 1=n2 , and contracting has the same e¤ect on market power as squaring
the number of rms. Output q = A=(n + 1n) is greater than the output without contracting,
q = A=(n+ 1) for n > 1, so contracting reduces market power in oligopolistic markets.
We can now return to the equilibrium RSI, where from (9)
r =
(n  1)k
Q
+
x
nq
=
(n  1)
n2
(
k
t
+ 1);
LS =
t
m+ t
; P =
p m
m
=
t
m
;
where t = A
n2+1
varies with the level of demand (which drives prices, and hence both the LI and
RSI). Clearly, neither LS nor P are any longer simple linear functions of the RSI. Nevertheless,
Figure 3, which shows the resulting relationships where m = 1; n = 3 = k, and where a varies
linearly from 6 to 13 (roughly corresponding to the shape of the British load duration curve, and
for which the RSI is less than 1 for 50% of the hours), suggests that LS is roughly linear in the
RSI, and this can be explored by substituting for z in the equations above. Note that the PCMU
looks more like a quadratic, perhaps explaining why London Economics found the quadratic a
better t for the PCMU.
If r is close to 1, then let   k(n  1) +m(n2   n+ 1) and r = 1 + z and expand LS as a
power series in z where is LS of the form LS = C(1 +Dz) 1:
LS =   r;
 =
k(n  1)

(1 +
mn2

);  =
k(n  1)mn2
2
:
For the case above,  = 132=69 = 0:78;  = 54=169 = 0:32. Regressing LI on the RSI in gure 3
gives  = 0:75;  = 0:28. This time  >  consistent with the empirical evidence (although the
di¤erences here are larger than observed).
9This covers the apparently more general case, Q = a  bp by dening units of output suitably.
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Figure 3: Relation between Lerner Index, Price-cost mark-up and RSI
As before,the Lerner Index is, from (6)
LS =
1
n2"
;
where again " is the elasticity of market demand at the equilibrium price.10 This corresponds to
(2) as s = 1=n2.
4.1 Asymmetric oligopolists
The general case considered in the appendix had a set of n capacity-unconstrained oligopolists
with marginal costs mi, with the remaining fringe of capacity-constrained rms producing con-
stant output equal to their total capacity K at the prevailing market price determined by linear
demand, p = a   Q. It is straightforward to demonstrate that there is no simple linear rela-
tionship between the LI and RSI in this case, but if we redene a modied RSI, , in terms of
exible demand, R, dened as total demand less the output of capacity-constrained rms and
imports, then it is possible to derive more appealing relationships. Dene B = a m K, where
m = 1n
P
mi, average marginal cost, and substitute into the equations in the appendix to give
the equilibrium outputs and the price:
p = m+
B
n2 + 1
; R =
n2B
n2 + 1
;
qi = n(m mi) + R
n
; xi = (1  1
n
)qi;
10For the linear demand 1=" = Q=p = (A+ c)=p  1. Dene  = c(n2 + 1)=A; then from (12) 1=" = n2=(1 + ),
while L = 1=(1 + ).
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The modied RSI is i = (
P
j 6=i kj + xi)=R and replacing xi = (1  1n)qi = (n 1)n2 R+ (n  1)mi
where m mi = mi, gives
i =
P
j 6=i kj + (n  1)mi
R
+
(n  1)
n2
:
Note that for linear demand, the elasticity of residual demand "RD = p=R. IfmS = m(1+S)
the relevant LI is
LS =
p mS
p
= 1  1 + S
"RD
m
R
;
= 1  (1 + S)m
"RD
i   (n  1)=n2P
j 6=i kj + (n  1)mi
;
=   i;  = 1 +
(1 + S)(n  1)m
(
P
j 6=i kj + (n  1)mi)n2"RD
;
 =
(1 + S)m
(
P
j 6=i kj + (n  1)mi)"RD
=
n2
n  1(  1):
Thus with this modied RSI, the LI is again linearly dependent on the RSI, although there
again no obvious reason why the coe¢ cients should have very similar values. Thus if n = 2 (the
Spanish case),  = 4(   1): Note that as estimated in Spain  = 3:5 and    1 = 3:1, but the
relationship was estimated on the traditional, not the modied RSI.
The nal appealing relationship that survives translation to an asymmetric oligopoly with
linear demand is the unweighted average LI, L:
L =
1
n
i=nX
i=1
(1  mi
p
) =
p m
p
=
p m
R
R
p
=
1
n2"RD
: (13)
which has the same form as (10) but with a di¤erent marginal cost:
5 Assessment of the suitability of the RSI
In very simple models, the Lerner index is negatively linearly related to the RSI with equal and
opposite coe¢ cients, as widely observed in the econometric estimations in the Sector Inquiry
(London Economics, 2007). For more complex market structures it seems desirable to dene the
RSI over exible output if one is to derive linear relationships between the Lerner index and the
RSI. One nal point to note (and discussed in the Sector Inquiry) is that the LI and the analysis
here relates to short-run marginal costs (SRMC), ignoring the long-run marginal cost (LRMC)
that included the cost of capacity, which must be covered if the rms are to make positive
prots. A full analysis would need to take account of stochastic features of electricity markets
(that determine the reserve margin) and investment decisions, which would determine the level
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of capacity relative to demand at various periods, and hence the equilibrium LI (measured on
the SRMC) needed to cover the LRMC.
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Appendix
The theory of forward contracting below follows Allaz and Vila (1993) under the assumption
that contact positions are revealed when the spot market opens, which means that there will only
be one round of contracting (Ferreira, 2006), and that traders are risk neutral when arbitraging
the expected spot and forward contract prices, ensuring their equality in expectation.
Proof of Proposition 1
Linear demand can be taken as D(p) = a   p; where supply equals demand in equilibrium
(i.e. no net imports): D(p) =
P
qi = Q The set of rms operating at full capacity (because their
marginal costs are su¢ ciently below the market price) has total capacityK, and the n asymmetric
Cournot oligopolists produce output qi with capacities ki, at constant marginal costs mi,11 and
contract cover xi. By denition their capacity constraints do not bind (otherwise they are part
of the capacity constrained set). The problem facing the oligopolists is to maximize prots given
by (4), and as before, the f.o.c.s w.r.t. qi are
qi = xi + p mi: (14)
Adding all outputs gives
K +
X
qi = K +
X
xi + n(p m) = Q = a  p;
p =
a  S + nm
n+ 1
; Q =
n(a m) + S
n+ 1
;
qi = xi +
a  S +Mi
n+ 1
=
a  S i +Mi + nxi
n+ 1
;
where S = K + X; X =
P
xi is committed sales, Mi =
P
j 6=imj   nmi;. S i = S   xi, and
m = 1n
P
jmj .
Solving for the equilibrium level of contract cover as before, the rst stage (marginal) prot
function from (4) is i = (p mi)qi (eliminating the second term through arbitrage). Substitute
for p and qi to give
i(xi) =
1
(n+ 1)2
(a  S i +Mi   xi)(a  S i +Mi + nxi):
The f.o.c.s are (setting a   m  A and noting that residual demand facing the oligopoly is
11Marginal costs need only be constant for the marginal generating plant - any inframarginal plant can have
any convex cost function provided its marginal cost at full capacity is less than mi.
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R = Q K)
2nxi = (n  1)(a  S i +Mi); which, summed gives
2nX = n(n  1)(A K)  (n  1)2X;
X =
n(n  1)(A K)
n2 + 1
; S =
n(n  1)A+ (n+ 1)K)
n2 + 1
;
p = m+
A K
n2 + 1
; Q =
n2A+K
n2 + 1
; R =
n2(A K)
n2 + 1
;
xi = (n  1)

(m mi) + A K
n2 + 1

;
qi = n

(m mi) + A K
n2 + 1

;
xi
qi
= 1  1
n
:
That completes the proof of the Proposition.
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